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Eugene Gressman*
There are many clashing absolutes in our national abortion
debate. There are conflicting constitutional absolutes. There
are differing moral and religious absolutes. There are warring
absolutes of a personal, social, economic and political nature, to
say nothing of ever-evolving medical absolutes.
Professor Laurence H. Tribe, the Harvard constitutional
scholar, analyzes and assesses these various absolutes in his penetrating study, Abortion: The Clash of Absolutes. This is not a legal
treatise, though lawyers can profit by reading it. Basically, the
book is addressed to the general public. While Tribe is not at his
best in writing for popular consumption, this book does manage
to convey the intractable nature of the competing values advanced by the hordes of combatants in the abortion war. At the
same time, Tribe demonstrates the transient nature of these
clashing absolutes. Absolutes, he notes, "themselves may be
contingent; they arise out of particular social contexts, problems,
and concerns that change as society changes.''
The element of change indeed marks virtually every aspect
of the abortion debate. The current abortion debate, pitting the
right of the fetus to live versus the right of a woman to determine
her own reproductive destiny, reflects a variety of fairly recent
changes in social and demographic forces, as well as advances in
medical technology and understanding. These societal changes
in turn, have led to counterpart changes in constitutional and
legal theories.
And yet, despite the evolving and changeable nature of these
absolutes, Tribe suggests that there is a basic underlying theme
in terms of women's traditional sex roles and traditional sexual
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morality. This theme has not changed with time, though it is
often muted in the voicing of contemporary absolutes. Tribe's
search for this theme begins by tracing the 200-year history of
abortion in America, as well as the story of abortion in foreign
lands. He notes that in the 18th and 19th centuries our society
was predominantly rural and family-oriented. It valued children
not as persons entitled to life or liberty but as sources of economic strength; and it was totally unconcerned with any so-called
rights of the unborn fetus.
Traditionally, women played a subordinate yet essential role
in perpetuating the farm economy. It was their moral duty to
marry and bear children who would one day till the soil. As Justice Bradley put it in 1873, "[t]he paramount destiny and mission
of woman2 are to fulfill the noble and -benign offices of wife and
mother."
Abortions in those times were sought primarily by single women, unfaithful to their noble offices, to conceal illicit sexual behavior, "behavior so harshly condemned at times that society's
rebuke must have been a terrible thing for women to endure." 3
Add to this societal condemnation the fact that 19th century
abortion methods were medically crude and dangerous, one
widespread method being to administer poisons to the pregnant
woman. Mortality from surgical abortions was also extremely
high. And yet, as Tribe reports, "by the middle of the nineteenth
century there was, by some estimates, one induced abortion for
every four live births." 4
The harsh anti-abortion statutes enacted during the 19th
century are seen by Tribe as largely the result of the medical profession's effort to professionalize the practice of medicine and to
halt the competition from the apothecaries and ill-trained doctors who engaged in crude abortion services. There were no
widespread moral or religious crusades against abortion. While
Catholicism traditionally forbade all abortions, it took no part in
the public and legislative debates in this era. The Catholic opposition to abortion was based solely on its interference with the
2 Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring). This statement of Justice Bradley led Justice Brennan, 100 years later, to
label it "an attitude of 'romantic paternalism' which, in practical effect, put women,
not on a pedestal, but in a cage," an attitude that became "firmly rooted in our
national consciousness" during the 19th century. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677, 684 (1973) (plurality opinion).
3 L. TRIBE, supra note 1,at 29.
4

Id.
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procreative purpose of sexual activity. Neither the Church nor
other anti-abortion groups had yet constructed a dogma that a
at or soon after conception and that early
fetus becomes a person
5
murder.
is
abortion
The 20th century, however, has witnessed a vast sea-change
in the components of the abortion debate, as well as an increase
in the number and the hardness of the absolutes at the heart of
those components. America has become more urban than rural,
and is becoming more service-oriented than industrialized.
There have been vast increases in population, accompanied by
the polarization of economic and ethnic classes and the augmentation of crime and drug sub-cultures. Superimposed on these
demographic changes have been at least four other developments: (1) increased freedom and opportunities for women, reflecting a rejection of the stereotyped notion that women have no
role in society other than as wives and mothers; (2) a massive
change in public attitude toward, and tolerance of, sexual activity
outside the traditional marital relationship; (3) increased sexual
activity by many teenagers; and (4) significant advances in medical techniques of contraception and abortion that make it easier
and safer to prevent conception or to terminate pregnancy.
In our contemporary post-industrial society, a pluralistic society in which all these demographic, attitudinal and medicinal
changes have occurred almost simultaneously, the absolutes
which mark the abortion debate have changed and become more
sophisticated. But despite the higher level of the modern clash
of absolutes, Tribe finds that underlying the present war against
abortion is the same anti-feminist feeling that motivated societal
condemnation of abortion in the 19th century. That underlying
feeling, in Tribe's words, is a reflexive willingness on the part of
pro-life proponents "to enforce traditional sex roles upon women and to impose upon them an unequal and harsh sexual
morality." 6
If Tribe's perception is correct, much of the current abortion
5

Tribe writes:
But the traditional Catholic position on abortion -

similar to

that taken by Aristotle and by some rabbinic scholars in the Jewish
tradition -

was that a fetus was not a human being until the time of

animation.' Under Catholic doctrine, a male fetus became animated
- that is, infused with a soul - at forty days after conception. A
female fetus was believed to become animated at a gestational age of
eighty days.
Id. at 31.

6 Id. at 237. Tribe also writes that the aversion to abortion rights, especially on

224

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 21:221

debate reflects, at least subliminally, differing views about woman's traditional role as wife and mother, as well as her developing role as an equal participant in the economic and public world.
The expressed concerns of the pro-life groups about the life and
the rights of the fetus then become a subterfuge for rejecting the
modern woman's assertion of right to control the use of her own
body and her own reproductive destiny. These groups, even
while mouthing deep concerns about "family values" and the immorality of killing the unborn, would in effect reinstate the 19th
century notion that the proper role of women is to stay in the
kitchen and the bedroom. Let them endure the "punishment" of
pregnancy and childbirth for having engaged in consensual sex.
Let them be satisfied with their ordained function of feeding,
breeding and perpetuating the human race.7
This role-of-woman thread runs through both the prochoice and the pro-life parts of the abortion fabric. Both groups
treat the abortion problem virtually as a sub-set of their views of
the proper role of women in contemporary society. Tribe describes the pro-choice forces as representing, rather disproportionately, "various privileged elites, the 'upper echelons' of
American society: scientists, intellectuals both inside and outside
universities and other academic institutions, high-earning corporate executives, other highly educated men and women, the
working press, much of the publishing industry, and all those
'pointy-headed' types whom George Wallace loved to hate ...
[who] are more likely to live along the nation's coastline (with a
gap in the Southeast) than in the heartland or in the South."8
And those are the forces most likely to be pro-feminist and to
the part of those who generally welcome the energetic uses of new technologies
such as nuclear reactors or computers,
would seem to reflect a deeply held sexual morality, in which pregnancy and childbirth are seen as punishment that women in particular
must endure for engaging in consensual sex. The fact that opposition
to abortion rights may in large part be about sexual morality is reflected, too, in the attitude . ..of those who oppose abortion and
seem willing to do almost anything to stop it - except take the effective
pregnancy-reducing step of providing birth control education and
better contraceptives.
Id. at 234 (emphasis in original). This position, Tribe suggests, is one "in which
sexual morality is primary, with any claim of a fetus's right to life taking a very
distant backseat." Id.
7 Id. at 237 (citing K. LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD
(1984)).
8 L. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 238.
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advocate the privacy right of women to make their own sexual
and natal choices.
On the other side, Tribe views the pro-life movement as
drawing "disproportionately from the remaining groups, those
'distanced from elite culture by their membership in relatively recent immigrant groups and in lower-status religious groups.'"'
These are the groups most likely to expound the values of family
life, to support government regulation of sexual demeanor, and
to oppose the economic and social liberation of women. These
pro-lifers are said to be "quick to denounce those who favor
choice as morally blind" and rarely claim to be especially tolerant
of diversity, to be distinctively broad-minded, to be uniquely
open to competing moral perspectives. ' "o
But, in Tribe's view, the pro-choicers fare little better when
it comes to broad-mindedness. They often show contempt for
what they view as "the prejudiced, superstitious, backward views
of pro-life groups," and view pro-life women in particular as "benighted victims of social conditioning that prevents their views
from authentically reflecting their own genuine needs and deepest beliefs." ' I
Tribe concedes that each side can and does project deeply
held personal and moral commitments.' 2 Given the strength of
these commitments, however, his proposed solution may appear
somewhat naive and unreal, at least in the short run. For both
sides, he suggests, "a greater measure of humility seems in order."'" That is, we should each treat the voices of our opponents
ag being no less worthy or meaningful than our own. Presumably, out of the welter of this "respectful" clash of absolutes, will
emerge the truth, the accommodations, and the compromises
that are necessary to resolve issues in a democracy, wherein "voting and persuasion are all we have."' 4
In a recent observation, Professor Tribe supplements his
proposal to settle the tragic public clash of absolutes by asking
each side to be more tolerant and respectful of opposing views.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 239.
11 Id.

12 Id. at 6,27.
13 Id. at 240.

14 Id. Tribe presumably relies upon the First Amendment principle that in an
uninhibited marketplace of abortion ideas the truth will ultimately prevail, to the
end that government may be responsive to the will of the people. See, e.g.,
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931).
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Admitting that a continuation of the loud battle between prochoice and pro-life forces promises no common ground, even in
a democracy, Tribe now emphasizes that the "only genuine solution is to build a world in which contraception and child care are
improved to the point where every child conceived is a child that
is welcome."' 5 Building upon a notion initially presented in the
book, Tribe urges that both sides focus their efforts on sex education, birth control, parental leave, infant health, and child care.
Presumably, in this best of all worlds, providing such a welcome
wagon for the unborn will cause -the rancor instilled by the abortion debate to recede if not disappear. But will it? Will the controversy about a woman's decision to abort her pregnancy be
dissipated by the increased availability of prenatal and postnatal
child care? Can every child conceived by rape or incest, or by
negligent promiscuity by those unfit or unprepared to be parents, or by those suffering from some dread inheritable disease,
be transformed into a child who is welcome?
Perhaps a more pragmatic solution to the abortion dilemma
is found in Tribe's discussion of new and more effective methods
of birth control and prevention. As he notes, medical science is
in the process of developing: (1) safer and less awkward forms of
contraception, (2) new and more effective abortion pills, such as
the French pill RU-486, and (3) an artificial womb or placenta,
either freestanding or implanted in a human host. 16 If these developments do not solve the abortion debate, at least they will
significantly reshape the controversy.
None of the solutions offered by Tribe address, let alone resolve, the basic tensions created by the efforts to free women
from their 19th century shackles. No amount of humility, no increase in prenatal or postnatal child care, no advent of the abortion pill, is likely to wipe away those tensions. Nor can the
national or state legislatures, largely composed of males, be expected to provide a quick or final answer to the problem of the
proper sexual role of females in the 20th and 21 st centuries. The
pregnant woman and her fetus have become pawns in the much
larger struggle for the sexual, social, and economic emancipation
of women.
This basic argument over the proper role of women in our
society has also affected the ensuing constitutional debates
15 N.Y. Times,Jul. 2, 1990, at A15, col. 5 (Op-Ed article authored by Prof. Tribe
entitled A Nation Held Hostage).
16 L. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 213-23.
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before the Supreme Court concerning abortion. The pro-choice
argument before the Court, that a woman has a fundamental privacy right of choice between bearing or not bearing a child is, but
an integral part of the contention that she should have the opportunity to free herself from the stereotyped notion that she is
duty-bound to do no more than "fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and mother." On the other hand, the pro-life argument that the state can force her to choose motherhood, since
otherwise the fetus would be deprived of potential life, is to restate and advance the age-old notion that, once impregnated, a
woman must lend her body to the developing fetus and thus fulfill her "noble and benign offices."
Professor Tribe summarizes the Court's abortion decisions
from Roe v. Wade' 7 to Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 8 with
emphasis, of course, on Roe. The Court's ruling in Roe is viewed
by Tribe as essentially a compromise between the two absolutist
views that: (1) a woman has an absolute right to decide whether
to terminate a pregnancy, at whatever time, in whatever way, and
for whatever reason she alone chooses, a position as to which the
Court said "we do not agree,"' 9 and (2) the unborn fetus is a
"person" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment and
therefore has an absolute right to life from the moment of conception. In rejecting the latter argument, the Court expressly
held that the word "person," as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, "does not include the unborn.
'7

' 20

As to the contention

410 U.S. 113 (1973).

The book was published early in 1990, prior to the
two latest abortion rulings of the Court: Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S.Ct. 2926
(1990), and Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 110 S.Ct. 2972 (1990),
both rendered on June 25, 1990. Tribe's observation in The New York Times,
supra note 15, comments on these two rulings, and in that sense is an addendum to
the book.
19 Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
20 Id. at 158. Ronald Dworkin has written:
Even though a fetus is not a constitutional person, it is nevertheless an entity of considerable moral and emotional significance in our
culture, and a state may recognize and try to protect that significance
in ways that fall short of any substantial abridgment of a woman's constitutional right over the use of her own body ....
A state's concern
for the moral significance of a fetus increases as pregnancy advances,
and it is particularly intense after viability when the fetus has assumed
a postnatal baby's form. This is a matter of resemblance. People's
instinctive respect for life is unlikely to be lessened significantly if they
come to regard the abortion of a just-fertilized ovum as permissible,
any more than it is lessened when they accept contraception. But the
assault on instinctive values is likely to be almost devastating when a
nearly full-term baby is aborted as when a week-old child is killed.
18 109 S.Ct. 3040 (1989).
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that life begins at conception, the Court found that since those
trained in medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary is not in a position to speculate as to the answer, at least not at this point in the development
of human knowledge. 2
The compromise reached by Roe is that a woman's fundamental privacy right to terminate or not terminate her pregnancy
is to be balanced against the government's compelling interest in
protecting both the woman's health and the life of the viable fetus. To implement that compromise, the Court constructed its
now-famous trimester system, whereby the woman's right of
choice predominates mainly during the first trimester, which
ends roughly at the point of fetal viability. During the second
and third trimesters, the interest of the government becomes increasingly compelling in terms of protecting the life of the viable
fetus. Only a dire threat to the mother's life or health, which is
also a governmental concern, can outbalance the governmental
concern for the fetus. Thus the Court neatly transferred the socalled fetal right to life to the protective arms of government,
which is able to assert and protect the viable fetus' right within
the trimester balancing schema.
Tribe is at his constitutional best in defending Roe against its
detractors. In the chapter entitled "Finding Abortion Rights in
the Constitution," Tribe portrays Roe as part of the judicial development of a Constitution that in critical parts is open-ended
and designed for ages to come, to be interpreted and applied in
order to meet exigencies which the Framers could not possibly
have foreseen.22 This understanding of the Constitution, with
particular reference to the open-ended "liberty" guarantee of the
Fourteenth Amendment, enables Tribe to train a withering constitutional fire on the likes of the Bork-Rehnquist-Scalia school of
neoconstructionism, much admired by the anti-abortion forces.
Only a few of the Borkian targets hit by Tribe need be mentioned here. The first and the "simplest" argument against Roe,
writes Tribe, is that judicial resolution of abortion rights is undemocratic, that abortion rights should be returned to Congress
and to state and local legislators to make legislative decisions in a
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously in the Abortion Case, RationJuris. Vol. 3, No. 1, 68, 77
(March 1990) (reprinted from New York Review of Books). See also Rhoden, Trimesters and Technology: Revamping Roe v. Wade, 95 Yale L. J. 639 (1986).
21 Roe, 410 U.S. at 159.
22 See L. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 106-07.
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democratic way. 23 Such was the position taken by Chief Justice
Rehnquist's plurality opinion in Webster,24 a position articulated
even more expressly in Justice Scalia's concurring remark in that
case that abortion is a field over which the Court "has little
proper business since the answers to most of the cruel questions
posed are political and notjuridical. ' ' 25 To which Tribe responds
that the very nature of judicial review of the constitutionality of
state and federal statutes is undemocratic, and was so meant to
be by the Framers. 26 And he cites Justice Jackson's statement for
the Court in Barnette that the "very purpose of a Bill of Rights was
to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of political majorities
and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. "27
Id. at 80-81.
109 S.Ct. at 3058, stating that the decision sustaining Missouri's restrictions
on abortion "hold[s] true the balance between that which the Constitution puts
beyond the reach of the democratic process and that which it does not." Id. The
Chief Justice sought to deny the dissenters' view that the Webster decision was "an
invitation to enact abortion regulation reminiscent of the dark ages." Id. But the
efforts of anti-abortion forces to secure enactment of just such regulations in various states, following the Webster ruling, make that denial shallow indeed.
25 109 S.Ct. at 3064. Justice Scalia reiterated this position in his concurring
opinion in the recent abortion case, Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,
110 S.Ct. 2972, 2984 (1990), stating that leaving the abortion matter to the political
processes "is not only legally correct, it is pragmatically so." Id. He added that the
Court "should end its disruptive intrusion into this [political] field as soon as possible." Id.
26 Professor Tribe correctly notes that "the Constitution provides for unelected
judges, appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, who serve for life
and whose salary cannot be diminished, precisely to prevent them from making
decisions based on the popular will, however formally and democratically expressed." L. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 81 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137 (1803)). Tribe further notes that however "undemocratic" a judicial
invalidation of a statute enacted by a simple majority through the legislative process may be, the Supreme Court's prime obligation to obey and enforce the Constitution justifies such invalidation, a proposition that is "a cornerstone of our system
of government." Id. And the fact that the Court may have acted in such an "undemocratic" fashion in the Roe case does not make that decision a usurpation of
power, or destroy the basic democratic roots of the Constitution. Id. The only
legitimate question, says Tribe, is whether Roe can find support in the Constitution.
Id. at 82.
27 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943). Professor Tribe might also have added James Madison's remarks to the House of Representatives, in the course of considering the Bill of Rights in 1789, that once an
individual right became embedded in the Bill of Rights, "independent tribunals of
justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of these rights;
they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the legislative or executive." 2 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTs: A DOCUMENTARY HisTORY 1031 (1971).
23
24
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A second basis for objecting to Roe, writes Tribe, is that the
right to choose to abort a fetus, at any point during pregnancy,
appears nowhere in the text of the Constitution or the Fourteenth Amendment thereof.2 8 In the words of Robert Bork, "the
right to abort, whatever one thinks of it, is not to be found in the
Constitution. ' 29 And not only does the Constitution contain "no
right to abortion," Justice Scalia adds, but such a right "is not to
be found in the longstanding traditions of our society, nor can it
be logically deduced from the text of the Constitution - not,
that is, without volunteering a judicial answer to the nonjusticiable question of when human life begins. "30
Tribe demonstrates that this kind of objection to Roe proves
too much, is too destructive of the many "liberty" interests which
the Court has long recognized as protected by the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The word "liberty" appears in the Fifth Amendment as a limit on federal power and in
the Fourteenth Amendment as a limit on state power. Neither
amendment purports to enumerate or articulate specific "liberty"
interests, although the Ninth Amendment tells us that any rights
that are enumerated in the Bill of Rights "shall not be construed
to deny or disparage others retained by the people."' 3 1 Thus, the
task for the Court is to discover what nonenumerated but retained "liberty" rights or interests are entitled to protection
under the due process umbrellas of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
These constitutional references to "liberty" provide the
means for executing the judicial task of identifying the retained
rights of the people. The word "liberty" lends itself only to
broad interpretation. It is not self-defining. It is one of those
broad constitutional terms, like "due process," "equal protection," and "privileges and immunities," that defy the efforts of
See L. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 82-83.
R. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 112 (1989). Bork also writes that Roe
contains:
not one line of explanation, not one sentence that qualifies as legal
argument . ..no one, however pro-abortion, has ever thought of an
argument that even remotely begins to justify Roe v. Wade as a constitutional decision .... There is no room for argument about the conclusion that the decision was the assumption of illegitimate judicial
power and usurpation of the democratic authority of the American
people.
Id. at 112, 115-116.
30 Akron, 110 S. Ct. at 2984 (Scalia, J., concurring).
3' See Carrasco and Rodino, "Unalienable Rights, " The Preamble, and the Ninth
Amendment: The Spirit of the Constitution, 20 Seton Hall L. Rev. 498 (1990).
28
29
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modern legal positivists and narrow constructionists to read into
them only that meaning which the words themselves convey or
which the original Framers meant to convey. As Justice Cardozo
once explained, our Constitution is designed as an instrument
filled with "great generalities" that "have a content and a significance that vary from age to age," a Constitution that "states or
ought to state not rules for the passing hour, but principles for
an expanding future. ' 32 It is the role and the responsibility of
the Supreme Court, as the ultimate guardian of the Bill of Rights,
to give such content, meaning and significance to the word "liberty" as will enable that generality to be adapted to situations
and crises never foreseen by the original authors of that word.
Nor, as Tribe notes, did those authors ever intend that the
fundamental liberties of the people be left in the hands of
majoritarian government "save only for those rights specifically
33
mentioned in the Bill of Rights or elsewhere in the document.
If there be such a thing as the "original intent" of the Framers,
the intent was precisely to avoid the Borkian notion that if a specific right or liberty is not mentioned in the document that right
or liberty does not exist in the world of the Constitution and thus
is not to be protected by the Supreme Court or other federal
courts. Again, witness the Ninth Amendment's reference to
rights retained by the people despite the absence of any specific
reference in the Constitution to such rights.
Tribe thus frontally assaults the naive notion that, in seeking
to discover whether a woman has a "liberty" right to choose to
abort a pregnancy, the Court must look primarily to the understanding or intention of the Framers. Did James Madison, speaking in the 18th Century, really intend or contemplate that the
word "liberty" encompasses such a choice? In Tribe's view, that
kind of constitutional inquiry and analysis is "outlandish. ' 34 And
rightly so. We do not know to this day precisely which Framer
inserted the word into the lexicon of the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendments; nor do we know what the intentions of that Framer
might have been. Indeed, we do not know and cannot discover at
this late date whose intentions are really relevant in this search
for the holy grail of "original understanding." Are we to look to
the understanding of all or only the articulate Framers of these
amendments (many of whom said nothing on the record), or
32
33
34

B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF
L. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 90.
Id. at 106.

THE JUDICIAL PROCESS

16 (1921).
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should we look to the understanding of the members of those
state bodies that ratified the amendments (whose debates and intentions were never reported) ?3 More importantly, as Tribe astutely observes, this search for the original understanding of the
word "liberty," with particular reference to a woman's liberty to
choose to abort, would make that understanding "a rigid talisman" that "would plunge our nation into a deep freeze in which
.. . only the very rights anticipated in 1791, when the Bill of
Rights was ratified, or in 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment
'3 6
was adopted, would be protected.

The process of adding new fundamental rights to the flexible
and ever-developing concept of "liberty" never ceases from generation to generation. The woman's right of choice respecting
abortion, first recognized in 1973 in Roe, is an offspring, an "emanation" if you will, of the earlier recognition of the right to use
contraceptives to prevent conception. 7 Both the abortion and
contraceptive rights are also direct descendants of the unarticulated liberty interest in privacy, which Justice Brandeis defined as
"the right to be left alone - the most comprehensive of rights
and the right most valued by civilized men.""8 The Court is constantly adding and recognizing new or expanded liberty interests
in response to the felt necessities of each generation. In the 1989
Term alone, the Court recognized a state prisoner's "significant
liberty interest in avoiding administration of antipsychotic
drugs, '

'3 9

and a competent person's "constitutionally protected
40

liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment.
35 Tribe's assault upon

the "original understanding" concept is fully docu-

mented in S. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION (1988).
36 L. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 107. Tribe also refers to James Madison's well-

known objection to the concept of original understanding. Tribe quotes Madison's
own words: "[a]s a guide in expounding and applying the provisions of the Constitution, the debates and incidental decisions of the Convention can have no authoritative character." Id.
37 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1972).
38 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,

dissenting).
39 Washington v. Harper, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 1036 (1990). The opinion of the
Court, written by Justice Kennedy, was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, the most adamant opponents of reading into the due process clause
unspecified liberty interests.
40 Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 110 S.Ct. 2841, 2851 (1990).
ChiefJustice Rehnquist authored the Court's opinion in this case, finding that this
liberty interest "may be inferred from our prior decisions." Id. at 2851. Justice
Scalia joined the Court's opinion but "would have preferred that we announce,
clearly and promptly, that the federal courts have no business in this field" and that
the point at which extraordinary medical measures to prolong a "worthless" life
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Neither of those liberty interests is mentioned or specified in the
Constitution, yet none but Justice Scalia expressed any reservations about giving them constitutional status.
Roe and its progeny have made it clear that the constitutional
right of privacy "is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy,"'4

and that a

"woman's right to make that choice freely is fundamental. ' 42
And despite all the political and popular furor created by such
rulings, and despite the multi-faceted obstacles that have been
placed in the path of the woman who desires to exercise her
abortion choice, it could still be said - 43 as of June 25, 1990 that "Roe remains the law of the land."

But with imminent changes in Court personnel and with
constant internal and external pressures to undermine and overrule the Roe doctrine, the woman's right of choice in abortion
matters is in peril. If Roe is eventually overruled, it would mark
the first time the Court has ever withdrawn a previously recognized fundamental privacy right from the category of "liberty"
interests protected by the due process clause. Indeed, if the legal
positivists like Justice Scalia have their way in insisting that only
those rights specifically mentioned or specifically contemplated
are incorporated in the "liberty" guarantee, the entire fundamental rights component of the due process clause could be reduced to rubble, much as The Slaughter-House Cases4 4 read
fundamental rights out of the privileges and immunities clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
That indeed is the ultimate and the frightening clash of constitutional absolutes, a clash which Professor Tribe does not
openly address. But for anyone involved in this growing constitutional debate, including the Justices of the Supreme Court,
Abortion: The Clash of Absolutes should be required reading. In
measured and respectful tones, Tribe has portrayed the disastrous consequences that can ensue if just one of the recognized
fundamental rights is thrown to the majoritarian wolves.
may be withdrawn is "neither set forth in the Constitution nor known to the nine
Justices of this Court any better than they are known to nine people picked at random from the Kansas City telephone directory." Id. at 2859.
41 Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
42 Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 772 (1986).
43 Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S.Ct. 2926, 2952 (1990) (opinion of Marshall, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
44 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).

